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The formulation of national strategy is critically important. In essence, strategy defines how a nation will direct and coordinate the elements of national power to achieve national goals.
In times of conflict, strategy determines the nation's approach to that conflict and defines the ends, ways, and means used to prosecute war. Ultimately, success or failure in war is determined by national strategy.
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Following the terrorist attacks of September 2001, the United States found itself at war with al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden's international terrorist organization. In response to the terrorist attacks, and because al Qaeda utilized it as a base for training and operations, the Bush Administration formulated a national strategy for war in Afghanistan. 2 As with any conflict, an effective national strategy for war is essential for success. What, then, is the U.S. strategy for the war in Afghanistan? And, more importantly, is it an effective national strategy that will enable the United States to achieve its goals?
What follows is a strategic analysis of the war in Afghanistan. My intent, first and foremost, is to articulate the strategic objectives for the war, the approaches taken to achieve those objectives, and the resources employed in each approach. In other words, my primary purpose is to identify the ends, ways, and means of the United States' strategy for the war in
Afghanistan. After describing what the United States is trying to accomplish in Afghanistan and
how it is pursuing those objectives, my intent is to provide an assessment of the U.S. strategy.
My assessment focuses primarily on whether or not the United States has achieved its strategic objectives. I conclude the analysis by describing a number of implications for the future.
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 , the Bush Administration established a national policy that would guide the United States' response to the attacks. In essence, the policy of the Bush Administration was to find those responsible for the terrorist attacks and bring them to justice. 3 In his first televised speech following the attacks, President
Bush expanded the policy to include not only the terrorist perpetrators, but also nations that harbor them. 4 In essence, the Bush Administration's policy made elimination of terrorist sanctuaries and support systems as important as elimination of the terrorists themselves. In doing so, the United States would disable the terrorist organization in Afghanistan, eliminate the sanctuary provided by the Taliban, and prevent the terrorists from mounting further attacks against the United States.
The Bush Administration elected to focus initial efforts on fighting the al Qaeda terrorist network in Afghanistan. 5 The al Qaeda network, a global organization with a global reach, included terrorist cells in nations around the world. However, the al Qaeda network thrived in Afghanistan where it enjoyed the support of Taliban authorities. In addition, many key leaders of the al Qaeda network lived in Afghanistan and had directed attacks against the United States from locations inside that country. Although other terrorist organizations also represented a threat to the United States, the Bush Administration decided to pursue those organizations in a broader war on terrorism. For the President and his national security advisors, the first order of business was the al Qaeda network in Afghanistan. As a result, in the days and weeks immediately following the events of September 11, the Bush Administration focused on formulating a strategy for war against al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters in Afghanistan. 6 
THE ENDS
The Bush Administration developed six strategic objectives for operations in Afghanistan.
Osama bin Laden and many of his key leaders relocated to Afghanistan from Sudan in 1996.
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They soon established headquarters and training camps in the country and began orchestrating operations from there. Following the attacks on September 11, the Bush Administration wanted military action that would inflict real pain on the terrorists and seriously damage the al Qaeda network. 8 To do so, the primary objective became to disrupt, and if possible destroy, the al Qaeda network in Afghanistan.
The United States also sought to convince, and if necessary compel, the Taliban to cease their support for terrorist organizations; the al Qaeda network in particular. In referring to the September 11 terrorist attacks, President Bush declared, "We will not only deal with those who dare attack America, we will deal with those who harbor them and feed them and house them."
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Statements from Administration officials made it clear that they saw little distinction between al Qaeda, who had planned and executed the terrorist attacks, and the Taliban, who supported the terrorists' activities. 10 Ultimately, the objective of the Bush Administration was to deny al Qaeda the sanctuary and support it enjoyed in Afghanistan.
In addition, the Bush Administration sought to demonstrate that the United States was not at war with the Afghan people or the Islamic religion. The Administration sought to carefully define the conflict in terms of terrorism, and to narrow the scope of the conflict to al Qaeda and its Taliban supporters. In doing so, the Administration hoped to avoid any implication that the United States was embarked on a crusade against Islam or engaged in a fight against innocent Afghanis.
3
The Bush Administration also sought to demonstrate U.S. resolve in this war on terrorism.
President Bush, and many of his top national security advisors, believed the Clinton Administration's response to bin Laden and international terrorism had been, "so weak as to be provocative; a virtual invitation to hit the United States again." 12 The objective of the Bush Administration was to convey, as forcefully as possible, the nation's commitment to fighting terrorism. In addition, many in the Bush Administration felt that a perceived aversion to casualties also emboldened terrorists to attack the United States or U.S. interests around the world. 13 To overcome that perception, the Administration intended to demonstrate total commitment to the fight, to include a willingness to accept casualties to win the war on terrorism.
The strategy also included an objective to build international support for the war in
Afghanistan. The Bush Administration believed it would need broad international support for the war.
14 Support from a wide array of coalition partners, to include Afghanistan's regional neighbors in particular, would provide the United States with the basing, access, and over-flight rights necessary to prosecute a military campaign in Afghanistan. Support from other nations would provide an added degree of legitimacy and could lessen the burden of war on the United
States. Accordingly, the Administration sought to involve as many nations as possible in the war in Afghanistan.
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The final objective of the Bush Administration was to stabilize Afghanistan following the fighting there. The intent was to avoid creating a vacuum in a notoriously turbulent, unstable nation. 16 When the fighting was over, the Administration wanted to establish conditions that would foster security and stability in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Administration wanted to eliminate the conditions that promoted terrorism and support for terrorism. The Administration's overall intent was to prevent the re-emergence of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the use of Afghanistan as a sanctuary for terrorist organizations.
THE WAYS
The United States adopted a variety of approaches to accomplish its strategic objectives Afghanistan. He also vowed that, "we will be patient, we will be focused, and we will be steadfast in our determination." 32 The Bush Administration intended for the themes expressed
in public statements to demonstrate resolve in winning the war in Afghanistan. In part, these public statements were also intended to dispel the notion that the United States was averse to taking risks and unwilling to accept casualties. Administration used public statements to counter any suggestion that the United States was involved in a "crusade" or engaged in a war against the Islamic religion. 44 The United States also conveyed support for Afghanistan by working to improve educational opportunities, addressing human rights issues, and improving access to information in Afghanistan.
The United States also employed information means to demonstrate U.S. resolve. By mobilizing the entire government for action, the Bush Administration intended to convey a willingness to use every means at its disposal to fight terrorism. 45 In essence, all of the diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts employed to accomplish other objectives also served to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the war in Afghanistan. In addition, the Administration continually voiced its resolve to see the war through to conclusion. 
ASSESSMENT OF THE STRATEGY FOR THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN
More than a year after the terrorist attacks, the United States remains at war in This objective is simply not achievable, until the United States and its allies eliminate the causes of radical Islamic fundamentalism, and the support it engenders in the Muslim world.
DEMONSTRATING SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE
The United States appears to have been successful in demonstrating that the war in Afghanistan was not directed against the Afghan people or against the Islamic religion. The humanitarian assistance effort was particularly successful in that regard. President Bush insisted on conducting a humanitarian assistance effort in conjunction with military action. 57 As a result, military forces integrated humanitarian assistance operations at the very outset of operations in Afghanistan. 58 Moreover, the humanitarian assistance effort limited the impact of war on the Afghan people, and clearly conveyed a sense of U.S. support. The inclusion of a humanitarian approach in the strategy worked to the United States' advantage.
However, the effort by coalition forces to limit collateral damage was somewhat less successful. Although the employment of precision guided munitions was essential in reducing the potential for collateral damage, military forces committed a number of highly publicized incidents of fratricide. Civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure did occur. In one case, an Afghan wedding party may have been the unintended target of coalition fires. As an aspect of strategy, the inability to sufficiently minimize collateral damage was difficult to achieve and negatively impacted the United States' ability to obtain full support of the local populace.
Demonstrating that the war in Afghanistan was not about Islam was another significant 
PREVENTING THE RE-EMERGENCE OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
The effort to prevent the re-emergence of terrorist organizations in Afghanistan is well underway, but is not yet complete. Nation building efforts continue in Afghanistan and military forces remain involved in providing security and stability. It is evident is that diplomatic efforts have overcome significant obstacles in establishing a viable central government in Afghanistan.
In addition, the U.S. strategy included provisions for creation of an embryonic Afghan police force and army. U.S. and Coalition efforts to rid Afghanistan of mines, weapons, and munitions, as well as attempts to improve living conditions in Afghanistan may also contribute to ultimate success in Afghanistan.
U.S. efforts will largely have been in vain, until the United States succeeds in establishing conditions that will prevent the re-emergence of terrorist organizations in Afghanistan, and the use of Afghanistan as a sanctuary. In that sense, the last objective for the war in Afghanistan may be the most important. To achieve ultimate success in Afghanistan, the United States must ensure its strategy includes viable approaches and sufficient means to accomplishing this objective.
OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF U.S. STRATEGY
The ultimate goal of any strategy is to achieve its political objectives. In the final analysis, it appears the U.S. strategy for war in Afghanistan has been marginally successful in doing so.
The strategy enabled the United States to disrupt the al Qaeda network in Afghanistan and eliminate the sanctuary provided by the Taliban. Moreover, the strategy enabled the United
States to focus the war on the terrorist organization and its supporters, demonstrate U.S.
resolve in the war against terrorism, and gain broad international support for the war in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the strategy did not enable the United States to fully rid Afghanistan of al Qaeda or its Taliban support. More importantly, the strategy has not provided the United States the ability to restore a sense of security and stability to Afghanistan.
Ultimately, success of the U.S. strategy will only occur when conditions in Afghanistan are no longer conducive for terrorist organizations to recruit new personnel, develop infrastructure, and plan and train for operations.
The great strengths of the U.S. strategy, however, are that it is flexible, includes a wide variety of ways and means, and recognizes the many dimensions of the problem in Afghanistan.
In formulating and executing the national strategy, the Bush Administration included several approaches to accomplish each objective. The Administration did not limit the strategy to any single approach or rely solely on any single concept to achieve an objective. Also, the Administration incorporated every element of national power in the U.S. strategy and applied several elements of power to achieve each objective. In other words, the U.S. strategy employed a variety of means in a variety of ways to achieve the strategic objectives, allowing for adjustment as necessary. This multi-faceted approach greatly increased chances for attaining the strategic objectives, and may yet combine to produce ultimate success, as the United States continues its efforts in Afghanistan.
The multi-faceted U.S. strategy also reflects a recognition that success in Afghanistan would require more than just attacking al Qaeda and the Taliban. Accordingly, the strategy included other objectives, such as gaining international support and demonstrating U.S. resolve.
Most importantly, the strategy included efforts to prevent the re-emergence of terrorist organizations in Afghanistan and the continued use of Afghanistan as a sanctuary for terrorists.
Any success against al Qaeda and the Taliban would only be temporary, unless the United
States addressed the conditions that allowed terrorists to thrive in Afghanistan. In essence, the multiple dimensions of U.S. strategy enabled the United States to tear down the terrorist network while building up a more stable Afghanistan. Ultimately, the United States can only succeed in Afghanistan by addressing both aspects of the problem.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Despite the strengths and successes of the U.S. strategy, the implications of the war in Afghanistan do not bode well for the future. The war in Afghanistan may also teach terrorist organizations valuable lessons that will make U.S. efforts less effective in the future. Terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda, will likely attempt to exploit asymmetric advantages by learning from the U.S. effort in Afghanistan, enabling them to adapt to U.S. strengths while exploiting U.S. weaknesses. In the final analysis, the war in Afghanistan demonstrates that the United States may be able to disrupt terrorist networks, but will find it very difficult to completely destroy them.
Similarly, the war in Afghanistan also demonstrates how difficult it is to eliminate non-state support for terrorist organizations. Although the United States showed it can defeat a state sponsor like the Taliban, it has not entirely eliminated non-state, tribal support in Afghanistan for terrorist organizations. In fact, Taliban fighters still have a base of support in Afghanistan and continue to work in concert with al Qaeda. Moreover, terrorist organizations enjoy varying degrees of support in friendly states, as well as states that actually sponsor terrorism. This is a problem that will be very difficult to overcome until the world, to include the United States, is able to address and eliminate the fundamental causes of terrorism. These causes include a diverse array of issues, from poverty and repression in authoritarian regimes, to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict.
The third major implication of the war in Afghanistan is the need for a multi-dimensional strategy for fighting terrorism. The United States will need to formulate and execute holistic strategies that incorporate a variety of ends, ways and means that are endowed with a degree of flexibility. By doing so, the United States can employ all of the elements of national power and increase its chances for success. It will not be enough for the United States to simply defeat terrorist organizations. U.S. strategy must also include efforts to ensure that the fundamental causes of terrorism are addressed. To be successful in the long term, the United
States and its allies must overcome the conditions that spawned the acceptance and growth of terrorism. That implies the need for a nation building aspect to U.S. strategy. In nation states that serve as a terrorist sanctuary, the United States will need to conduct a nation building effort to ensure that sanctuary is permanently eliminated.
A final implication is associated with the need to address national resolve and cost. The costs of fighting a terrorist organization, coupled with a nation building effort, will be very expensive for the United States. Although the Bush Administration demonstrated great resolve for the war in Afghanistan, the United States must be willing to expend additional resources in the long term fight against terrorism, in order to achieve long term solutions. Moreover, fighting terrorist organizations and conducting nation building will require an extended effort. As necessary, the United States must be ready for a protracted, global war against terrorism. WORD COUNT = 7981
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